The purpose of this research is to examine why certain restaurant franchisors utilize sub-franchising agreements while others do not. The research tests capital market, agency, and brand name capital explanations for the existence of sub-franchising in the restaurant industry. Proxies for measuring the franchisor's use of the capital markets, agency costs, and brand name capital are developed and described. Logit analysis is employed to examine the relationship between these factors and the use of sub-franchising. The empirical results are mixed. The results support the use of sub-franchising when the costs of monitoring franchisees are high and when franchisors wish to overcome weak brand name capital. The research found no evidence to support use of sub-franchising as an alternate to raising equity capital.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to identify what motivates franchisors to enter into subfranchse agreements. Sub-franchising is a provision whereby a franchisor grants the right to a sub-franchisor to assume the role and rights of the franchisor in selling to prospective franchisees the ability to establish and operate franchsed units within a specified regon. Simply put, the sub-franchisor becomes a virtually autonomous franchisor in the designated region. To date, the sub-franchisor's role has not been clearly defined in the hospitality literature and what motivates franchisors to seek sub-francluse arrangements is still an open question. mstorically, in explaining the existence of various franchising arrangements, capital market (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969; Hunt, 1973; Caves & Murphy, 1976 ) and agency theories have been emphasized (Rubin, 1978; Brickley & Dark, 1987) . In addition, both of these theoretical explanations have incorporated the issue of brand name capital (Fong, 1987; Norton 1988a Norton , 1988b .
With respect to the existence of sub-franchising from the capital market theoretic perspective, the same rationale can be applied as has been applied to general franchising: sub-franclusing (like franchising) may be seen as a more efficient mechanism for certain franchisors to raise capital (Matusky, 1992) . Franchisors may effectively utilize the "franclusee's capital" to build units (i.e., let the franchsee finance and build the units) thereby eliminating the need for franchsors to raise investment capital for expansion (Whittemore, 1994; Lowell, 1991) . In addition, franchisors are able to obtain additional funds from other sources associated with sub-franchse contracts. First, a sub-franchsor pays area development fees to the franchisor to acquire exclusive territorial rights. Second, sub-franchisors share the franclusee's initial fees and royalties with the franchisor.
As another explanation for sub-franclusing, agency theory focuses on the efficiency of the incentive features of the franchise relationslup (Carnev & Gedailovic. 1991 
own multiple units or even transfer the monitoring; duty to a sub-franchisor (Carnev & ~edajlovic; Brickley & Dark, 1987) . sub-franzhisiig may therefore be appropriate when the marginal cost of utilizing a sub-franchise contract is lower than the marginal cost of monitoring individual franchised units.
From a brand name capital perspective, it has been suggested that a firm's tendency to franchise may be inversely related to the value of the firm's brand name capital (Norton, 1988a; ~a i e s & ~u r~h ; , 1976) . Likewise, the tendency to utilize sub-franch;sing mav be inverselv related t o the franchise svstem's abilitv to deliver qualitv consistent 1 w i h the franchisor's brand name capital. since there is lithe in volvemgnt bythe franchisor in sub-francluse/franclusee contracts, reliance on sub-franclusing can make the franchisor vulnerable to quality chiseling; by its franchisees.
This paper will explore whether there is empirical sup port for these theoretical constructs in relation to sub-franchising. The paper is organized as follows: Section II will review the literature pertinent to the theory of sub-franchising; Section I11 will present the research methodology, models, and data used in the study; Section IV will provide a statistical analysis and discussion of the empirical results; and Section V will conclude with a summaw and suggestions for future research.
Literature Review

Capital Market Explanations
The capital market explanation of franchising may also apl 3ly to sub-franchising as it --depicts franchising as a vehicle designed to provide franchisors with financial capital when the firm cannot obtain financing due to imperfections in the capital markets (Lowell, 1991) . The financial resources supplied by each franchisee are viewed as an indirect method of raising capital that can then be used to accelerate growth and accomplish scale efficiencies and build brand name capital (Lundberg, 1994; Caves & Murphy 1976; Oxenfeldt & Kelly 1968 -1969 Mathewson & Winter, 1985) . A survey by Lafontaine (1992) reported that 76 out of 130 franclusers who responded said that franchising provided funds that allowed their firm to expand more rapidlv than otherwise would have been 1 the case. Jensen (1989) noted that franchising is a hybrid capital instrument which is different from capital raised through the public equity market. Stated differently, internally-equity capital through the public financial markets and those that do not.
Whether or not there is a relationship between a firm's decision to sub-franchise and its involvement in the public equity markets is a testable hypothesis. If sub-franchising is be observed among firms that do not have publicly traded stock. Mathewson and Winter (1985) armed that the costs associated with monitoring; and her contractual responsibilities. Since a franchsee's level of effort and performance is very difficult and costly to measure by the franchsor, profit-seeking franchisees have an incentive to take advantage of any unspecified elements in the contractual relationslup able elements of franchise contracts. the likelihood of a franchseeengaszing in ovvortu-
Agency Theory Explanations
The first problem is the incentive franchisees have to "free ride" on the value of franchsor's brand name capital at the expense of the franchisor or other franchsees in the same franchse system. The free rider problem is an agency problem that sub-franchising may help to alleviate. Franchsees can free ride on the quality of other franchsees witlun the same franchse system (horizontal free ride). Horizontal free ride problems occur when a franchisee does not deliver the guaranteed quality prescribed by the franchise agreement. With inferior products and service, the franchisee can reduce the cost of his individual operation, with savings directly transferred to h m . In the meantime, costs are borne by other franchisees who do not engage in such practices.
Given the possible free ride problem, Bricklev and Dark (1987) suggest selling exclufrom free riding. The sub-franchisor will monitor, control, evaluate, and analyze the sales would. This practice allows the franchisor to minimize agency costs with respect to bonding and monitoring the franchise system. "Under investment" by franchisees is the second significant agency problem that sub-franchising may help to control. Since franchisees will have more of their wealth concentrated in single units than the franchisor, franchisees may have an incentive typically takes place more frequently when franchise units are clustered together. For whensuch expenditures provide benefits to other nearby outlets not ownedPby the franalternative is to grant geographically concentrated exclusive oversight rights to a sub-I Sub-franchse contracts specify that a sub-franc.hsor becomes a residual income recipient in exchange for using the franchsor's resources. The agreements also stipulate that a sub-franchsor is responsible for developing new markets and monitoring new and existing franchisees on behalf of the franchsor. In return, a sub-franchisor is entitled to the margin difference between the amount received from the franchsees and the amount helshe pays to the franchisor. Being a residual income-recipient, a sub-frai~chisor has an incentive to monitor and evaluate the performance of franchsees carefully.
In the economic literature, the royalty rate has been widely approximated to explain agency theory in risk sharing (Cheung, 1969; Blair & Kaseman, 1982) , and moral hazard and sharecropping (Stiglitz, 1974) . The franchisee's royalty serves not only to allocate risk and to motivate hard work, but also to direct the allocation of the agents' attention among their various duties (Lafontaine,l992; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) . As such, agency explanations have led researchers to use the royalty rate to measure monitoring costs (Lafontaine, 1992; Wimmer,1992) . More specifically Lafontaine (1992) indicates that the royalty rate will be invei-sely related to the importance of the franchisee's input and the difficulty in monitoring the franchsee. Since franchisees are the residual claimants of their own units, smaller royalty rates provide them with an incentive to exert greater efforts. Likewise, Wimmer (1992) suggests that as the need for a franchisor's monitoring increases, the royalty rate is expected to decrease. This would lead to the expectation that franchsors with a sub-franchise system could charge hgher royalty rates due to the fact that financial incentives (i.e., lower royalty rates) are not needed to insure that franchsees conform to the franshisor's standards and requirements (due to the monitoring role played by the sub-franchsor).
Labor-intensiveness also strongly affects the amount of monitoring in the restaurant industry. The amount of labor required by the restaurant differs from one segment to another. For instance, quick serve food operations heavily utilize mechanization to conform to product standardization and generate economies of scale (Lundberg, 1994) . Compared to full service restaurants, the simplicity and standardization of quick serve food operations reduces costs associated with monitoring and training unit managers and employees. When costs of monitoring are high, franchisors are likely to pass monitoring problems to sub-franchisors (Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991) . Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the hgher labor to output ratio of family-style restaurants may result in more franchisors relying on sub-franchising agreements to lower the costs of monitoring than franchsors of quick service restaurants. This also represents a hypothesis.
Brand Name Capital Explanations
Among the major challenges encountered by a franchsor is the need to maintain its brand name reputation. A primary purpose of a franchsor's brand name is to convey a message to customers about the quality and consistency of the franchisor's product. For instance, customers expect the same quality of food, service, and ambiance throughout a restaurant franchse system. Sub-franchising systems may increase the difficulty of maintaining the franchsor's brand name capital because of the minimal involvement between franchisor and franchisee.
Since brand name capital is an intangible asset, it can be difficult to quantify and measure directly. However, several researchers have theorized and empirically demonstrated that a relationship exists between brand name capital and the franchise fee structure, i.e., the initial fee and subsequent periodic royalty payments (Sen, 1993; Rubin, 1978) . Rubin argued that royalties represent the proportion of the present value of the intangible franchise resources that cannot be incorporated into the initial franchise fee (since the franchisor is not able to predict the franchsee's future profits). Rubin's arguments suggested that initial fees and royalties should work as substitutes for each other.
Blair and Kaserman (1982) made a similar observation and stressed the financial name cavital bv makine use of initial franchse fees and subseauent rovalties. A comstrategy. In other words, the value of the franchisor's brand name can be derived by capitalizing its stream of earnings due to initial fees and future royalty payments from its franchisees (Caves & Murphy, 1976) . Thus, if franchisors that utilize sub-franchsing systems have sipnificantlv lower brand name capital than franchisors that utilize traditional paid by a kanchsee will be lower for the sub-franchising systems.
Research Methodology
Data and S a m~l e Descri~tion
mine whether or not an individual franclisor offers sub-franchise contracts and to obtain tracts. Initially, a sample of 136 fast food restaurants and 74-family restaurants were obtained from the Source Book. Restaurant franchsors headquartered in Canada and franchsors with only company-owned units were then excluded. The remaining sample consisted of 136 firms containing a total of 91 fast food restaurant franchisors and 45 familystyle restaurant franchisors. Among these, 26.4% of quick serve food companies (n=24) and 36% of family restaurants (n=16) were involved in sub-franchise agreements. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the sample. To test the prediction of a franchsor's decision to sub-franchse requires the assessment of the explanatory power of a single variable holding constant the explanatory power of other independent variables. When the outcome variable is binary or dichotomous, the logt model is one of the most appropriate methodologies for solving the classification problem involving two or more attributes (Gujarati, 1991) . A logit model can identify a single model that is most significant in discriminating between the characteristics of franchisors who engage in sub-franchise contracts and those that do not. Logit estimation allows a comparison of the relative importance of the explanatory variables by delineating the differences in the two groups. Additionally, the use of a logt model permits analysis of the impact of a series of explanatory variables on the probability that firms use sub-franchising.
The predictive ability of the model is measured by the percentage of franchisors classified correctly. The classification of accuracy percentage is a useful measure of goodnessof-fit in a logt model (Maddala, 1992) . Another indicator measuring the sipficance of the model, the likelihood ratio test, offers explanatory information on the strength of the model. For large samples, the likelihood ratio test statistic has an x2 distribution with K degrees of freedom where K is the number of parameters specified in the model. The null hypothesis can be rejected if hLR n x2.
To test the variables related to the choice of sub-franclusing agreements, the following empirical logit specification is estimated: If one of the economic functions of sub-franchising is to provide a means of raising capital for franclusor companies, companies that do not access publicly traded capital markets should be less likely to subfrancluse. The STOCK variable indicates whether or not the firm utilizes publicly traded equity (as reported in stock section of NationS Restaurant News). Therefore, the coefficient of the STOCK variable is expected to be negative.
The royalty rate, ROYAD (as reported in 1993 Source Book), is measured as a percentage of a franchisee's revenue. However, as in Lafontaine (1992) and Sen (1993) , royalties plus advertising cost as a percentage of sales are used as a proxy for the effective royalty rate. The rationale behind this approach is that franchsees have little information as to whether their advertising contridition is actually spent for advertising purposes. Since it is hvpothesized that the cost of monitoring is lower in a sub-franchise svstem, we would 1 expect that the tendency to sub-franchise h o u l d be associated with higher effective royalty rates. The expected sign of the coefficient of ROYAD is thus I As indicated previously brand name capital is measured by the franchisor's ability to extract rents from the franchsees. The initial franchise fee and present value of effective royalties as a percentage of sales are summed as a proxy for brand name capital. The purpose of this variable is to capture the franchisees' financial obligations whch result from renting the franchisor's brand name capital. It is reasonable to assume that the 1 u 1 strength of a franchisor's brand name capital is positively related to hgher initial fees as well as higher present value of effective royalties.
-In order to calculate the present value of the royalties, average sales of franchised units are calculated by talung the industry median total sales per full-time equivalent employee and multi$lying by the average number of full-time employees required to run a franchsed unit. Restaurant l n d u s t~y Operations Report (1993)~ provided the data for median total sales per full-time equivalent employee. Brand name capital (BRAND) is in $1,000 increments. Since it is hypothesized that franchisors with strong brand name capital are less likely to utilize sub-franchsing, the coefficient of brand name capital is expected to be negative.
The variable DUM (1 if a fast food restaurant, 0 for family style restaurant) is a dummy variable that provides an opportunity to investigate behavioral differences between different types of restaurants as far as monitoring motives to undertake subfranchise agreements are concerned. As stated previously the cost of monitoring is assumed to be positively related to labor intensity. A quick serve food operation is, in 1 many ways, more like a manufacturing enterprise than a traditional restaurant (Power, 1992) . The systematic substitution of equipment for people reduces labor in fast food operations (Levitt, 1976) and consequently, reduces the costs of monitoring labor. On the other hand, family restaurants offer a variety of menu items along, with personal service and thus require more labor than fast food restaurants. It is reasonable to expect that the higher labo; to output ratio of a family-style restaurant encourages franchsors to rely on I sub-franchising agreements to lower costs of monitoring. Thus, the expected sign of the coefficient for the hummy variable is negative.
- Table 2 defines the independent variables (STOCK, ROYAD, BRAND, DUM) used in the analysis and summarizes the measures along with the hypothesized direction of the relationship between the variable and the use ofsub-franchising. ROYAD measures monitoring cost. The mean value of the ROYAD is 6.70% for firms sub-franchise contracts. The second hypothesis predicts that firms with higher-royalty rates are more likely to sub-franchise. The sign of the royalty rate is consistent with the hvvothesized direction and ROYAD is statisticallv sisznificant at the 10% level. This suechat do not sub-franchise.
-With respect to brand name capital, the hypothesis predicts that the dependence on sub-franchising is lower if a franchisor has a strong brand name capital. The brand name capital variable is statistically significant at the 5% level and supports hypothesis. The present value of royalties is also an important variable for distinguishing between franence that 1s statistically sigruficant (at 5% level) and in the direction hypothesized. Tlus that the value of intangible assets (i.e., brand namLcapital) is associated with capitalizing its stream of earnings and is optimized by owners who combine it with other inputs (Caves & Murphy 1976) .
Logistic Analysis
The logit estimate results, using 136 observations, are reported in Table 4 . The prediction results are robust. The likelihood ratio test statistic for the loPit eauation is -75.62 and
Appendix: Final Model Estimation and Analysis
In order to examine the effect of restaurant type on a firm's decision to undertake sub-franchise agreements, interaction terms between the industry dummy variable and each related variable were considered in a model of the following construction:
In t h s setting, the coefficients of P5P7 indicate the effect of the STOCK, ROYAD, and BRAND variables on the tendency to use sub-franchise contracts for fast food restaurants.
One of the problems associated with the addition of new variables of this type in the regression model is multicollinearity among the independent variables (Neter et al., 1989) . To quantify the existence of multicollinearity, the variables included in the model were tested using correlation analysis. A high correlation between STOCK and DSTOCK (r = 0.76), and DUM and DBRAND (r = 0.92) were found. Highly intercorrelated regressor variables can often generate illogical results such as instability in the size and sign of a regression coefficient. As a result, intercorrelated data may play a disruptive role and lead to model misspecifications. Hence, DSTOCK and DROYAD variables were discarded and only the DBRAND variable was added to Model 1 to examine if inclusion of t h s interaction term significantly improves the power of the model. The interaction term DBRAND is equal to the product of the value of the DUM multiply by value of BRAND. Table 5 shows estimated coefhcients along with the log-likelihood and deviance for each model.
When the interaction term DBRAND is added in Model 2 changes in the deviance (i.e., the likelihood ratio test statistic) is only 0.1. Comparing the results to the chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom fails to show statistical sigruficance. This suggests that brand name capital is an important consideration in the franchsor's decision to engage in sub-franchse agreements. However there is no significant difference in brand name capital effects between quick service and family restaurants.
Variables Intercept
Stock Royad Brand Durn Dbrand Model 1 -1.560 -0.552 0.327 -0.002 -1.178 (-1.97)" (0.91) (2.48)"" (-1.98)"" (-2.47)"" Model 2 -1.447 -0.4088 0.312 -0.0022 -1.3206 0.0006 (-1 -641) (-0.674) (2.389)"" (-1.833)" (-2.004)"" (0.300) Table 5 Comparision of models with and without interaction term Note : t ratios appear in parentheses.
Model 1 : Log likelihood for logstic -75.62 *** Model 2 : Log likelihood for logstic -75.57 *** Likelihood Ratio Test Statistics (G) : 0.1 (-2 times the difference between the log-likelihoodof model 1 and model 2) *** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level
